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INTRODUCTION

The ICSID Convention1 was negotiated primarily for the protec
tion of foreign investments and considerations of economic
development in the host state, particularly in the global south. The
global south refers to developing countries in Africa, Latin America,
and Asia. On the other hand, the global north is made of countries con
sidered more developed, advanced and richer in terms of capital and
economic development. The ICSID Convention established the Inter
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").2
PhD (Aberdeen); Attorney at Law; Law Professor at Salmon P. Chase College of
Law, Northern Kentucky University. A version of this article was originally presented at
the IGLP, Harvard Law School African Regional Conference held January 17-24, 2016 at
the University of Cape Town, South Africa. I am grateful to the editorial staff of the FAMU
Law Review for their assistance in publishing this article. This article is dedicated to my
father, Chief Michael I. Okpe of blessed memory. The usual caveat applies. The author may
be reached at f.o.okpe@gmail.com.
1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na
tional of other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter the
ICSID Conventionl.
2. See Felix O. Okpe, Endangered Element of ICSID Arbitral Practice: Investment
Treaty Arbitration, Foreign Direct Investment and the Promise of Economic Development in
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ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and investment treaty arbi
tration between investors and state parties.-*
Under international law, and perhaps in the context of the IC
SID Convention, it is fair to state that; the potential for investment
disputes is more likely with respect to foreign investments hosted in
the global south. In most situations when investment disputes arise,
foreign investors often allege that an act that includes regulatory ini
tiatives of the host state or an omission attributable to the host state,
has occasioned a violation of applicable investment agreement.4 Some
times the basis for the alleged breach results from underlying
contractual claims by the foreign investor.5 Thus, investment claims
have created the intellectual foundation for a spirited debate over
whether the insulation of contractual claims from treaty claims should
be standardized under international investment law and arbitration.
There are valid arguments on both sides of the divide. In spite of good
attempts to articulate a more acceptable position on the issue, includ
ing the suggestion of an "integrationist approach" to reconcile the
opposing propositions on this critical matter, the jury of scholars is still
out on that question.6 Arbitral jurisprudence has provided little or no
guidance on the resolution of the debate either. The underlying current
Host States, 13 RICH J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 217, 218 (2014). See also The ICSID Convention,
supra note 1, at art. 1(1-2).
3. See Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflict, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2546
(2014).
4. See Lise Johnson & Oieksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contract, Host state "Com
mitments" and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 (3) AME. R. INT'L ARB. 361,
362 (2013) (stating that * I il n the international law realm, tribunals have been taking a wide
view of enforceable 'commitment' and have been imposing liability for a broad range of gov
ernment measures (even measures of general applicability taken in the public interest) that
interfere with those obligations").
5. See generally Kate Parlett, Claims under Customary International Law in ICSID
Arbitration, 31 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L. J., 434 (2016).
6*
^ee -*ames ^RAWFORD, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT'L.
351, 351-52 (2008). Crawford characterized the debate this way:
No issue in the field of investment arbitration is more fundamental, or more dis
puted, than the distinction between treaty and contract. There is a struggle between
those who beheve bilateral investment treaty (BIT) claims should be insulated from
contractual claims and those who want to relate the two. That struggle has led to a

? rnnl;"rPrUK Tf
a *L

te,ndenCy t0 cari<»ture opposing positions. In these
and further reflection are necessary before any consensus

and

achieve immedint
^7"
7 p[oponent in the debate are no more likely to
the unde^nln^^Th6 t3"06! .7 if V1CWS °f any other- " • (Crawford juxtaposed
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by its laws
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promoting the debate is the penchant of host states in the global south
to rely on national laws as a justification for non-compliance with in
vestment protection obligations contained in investment agreements.7
This has become problematic in investment treaty arbitration. It has
also led to inconsistent jurisprudence and a re- emerged "international
minimum standard for the interpretation and adjudication of invest
ment disputes under the ICSID Convention.8 The international
minimum standard has resurrected in the form of standard umbrella
clauses,that are often relied on by arbitral tribunals to elevate con
tract claims to treaty claims, and the fair and equitable treatment
("FET") standard on the treatment of foreign investments in the host
state, regardless of the provisions of national law or the host state reg
ulatory initiatives on foreign investment. The global south is still
battling to appreciate this evolving phenomenon under international
investment law and arbitration. More broadly, this development, more
than anything else, has created significant confusion between consider
ations for the protection of investments and contribution to economic
development of the host state through foreign investment.10 The com
mon response by host states in investment arbitration commenced
under the ICSID Convention, have centered around the question of the
7. The term investment agreements or international investment agreements will be
used interchangeably with Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter BITs).
8. See e.g., SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, Aug. 6, 2003, 8 ICSID Rep. 406
Ihereinafter SGS v. Pak.l; SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, Jan. 29, 2004, 8 ICSID Rep. 515|hereinafter SGS v. Phil.).
9. An umbrella clause is a provision found in most investment agreements that im
poses a requirement on the host state or the other contracting party to guarantee the
observance of the obligations it entered into with investors from the other contracting party.
A typical foreign investment agreement is usually bilateral. It is an agreement entered be
tween two contracting states for the promotion and protection of foreign investments in
their respective territories. A significant innovation found in these types of agreement is the
resolution of investment disputes through the mechanism of investment arbitration under
the ICSID Convention subject to the requirement of consent by the two contracting states.
The investment agreement essentially protects the investment of investors from either of
the contracting parties in the host state. For further reading on umbrella clauses. See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract,
Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developed and Developing Countries in Foreign
Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (2006).
10. Id. at 138 (noting that "|o]ne sees that the debate over interpretation of (umbrella
clausesl is actually the latest incarnation of a long-standing and continuing conflict between
the investment interests of developing countries and developed countries .... |E)ven though
such a BIT imposes reciprocal obligations on both Contracting States, its effects are asym
metrical . . . . |T|. he disagreement over umbrella clauses in this scenario is in effect an
extension of the enduring tension between developing and developed countries on foreign
investments").
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definition of investment and their unsuccessful attempts to challenge
investment claims based on the provisions of national laws.11 National
laws in this respect are mostly represented by underlying contracts
that were sometimes in conflict with umbrella clauses and FET stan
dard12 of foreign investments under most investment agreements.1'1 A
historical analysis is proper to guide the global south in negotiating
effective investment agreements and reduce the over-reliance on na
tional laws to regulate and interpret investment agreements. Granted
that there is a lack of a consensus on the proper place of contractual
and investment claims, the prevailing trend under international in
vestment law and arbitration has been the subjugation of the national
laws of the host state to an international minimum standard en
trenched in BITs.14 This article will attempt to show that, in the days
of yore, the international minimum standard, as the term was under
stood under customary international law, was a controversial standard
considered critical by proponents from the global north for the protec
tion of foreign investments under international law.15
There is no question that in cases of inconsistency between na
tional laws and international law, and by extension international
investment law, international law prevails. This notion requires fur
ther analysis from the perspective of the global south. This article will
locus on the nature of foreign investment disputes between host state
Con venter'A
^rab°wsk. Comment, T,le Definition of Investment under the ICSID
Convention. A Defense of Salmi, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 289-308 (2014). For the approach of
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from the global south and investors from the global north within the
framework of the ICSID Convention."* Statistically, investment arbi
tration under the ICSID Convention investment is significant.17 The
trend could be attributed to the advantages that may be associated
with the use of that mechanism.1* The settlement of investment dis
putes is dominated by access to ICSID arbitration that includes ICSID
Additional Facility.19 The system also accommodates a foreign investor
whose country is not a signatory to the ICSID Convention.20 At this
juncture, a caveat is deserving of mention. This article does not seek to
offer ideas on how to limit access to investment arbitration under the
ICSID Convention. On the contrary, this article offers a fresh approach
to understanding the nature and interpretation of foreign investment
disputes from a historical perspective through the concept of a rein
carnated international minimum standard that is now the cornerstone
of internationalization of investment disputes.
This article proposes that, the internationalization of invest
ment disputes through the theory of internationalization of state
contracts is a reincarnated international minimum standard under in
ternational investment law and arbitration. Most countries in the
global south do not sufficiently understand this new standard that is
now critical when negotiating and interpreting BITs. This article is an
insight into the metamorphosis of this standard with reference to the
ICSID Convention and the global south from an historical perspective.
It references Judge Lauterpacht's opinion in the Norwegian Loans
16. See Samuel K. B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reap
praisal, 37 INT'L & COMB. L.Q. 588, 588 (1988) (suggesting that there are fundamental and
international issues raised by the conduct of international investment law in the relation
ship between the host states and foreign investors that is a product of a clash of juristic
opinion and more particularly described as a 'pervasive dispute associated with both EastWest and North-South conflicts).
17. See Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitra
tion: An Informed Approach to Empirical Studies About Law a Response to Professor Yackee,
12 SANTA CIJVRA J. INT'L L. 303, 308 (2014).

18. See Judith Levine, Navigating the Parallel Universe of Investor-State Arbitrations
under the UNCITRAL Rules, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION
369, 369-70 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
19. Id.
20. See David A. Gantz, Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID, the ICSID Additional
Facility and the UNCTAD Arbitral Rules, U.S.-VIETNAM TRADE COUNCIL EDUCATION FORUM,
jAug. 17 2004), http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/Gantz/Gantz_ICSID.pdf (stating that
"Ii]nvestor-State Arbitration has become a common occurrence in the 40 years since the
ICSID Convention was concluded, particularly during the last ten years . . . There have
been decisions in more than a dozen cases under NAFTA Chapter 11 (the majority under
ICSID Additional Facility Rules), and more than 30 notices of arbitration, about 60% of
which are between the United States and Canada ..."). Canada and Mexico are not parties
to the ICSID Convention.
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Case as a foundation to theorize that the nature and settlement of for
eign investment disputes reflects the theory of internationalization of
state contracts as the new international minimum standard. If the
global south fails to appreciate and understand this development when
negotiating foreign investment agreements, it can raise serious ques
tions about the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. This can
still the progressive development of international investment law and
arbitration. Such an outcome will defeat the purpose of the ICSID Con
vention negotiated and ratified for the promotion and protection of
foreign investment in the host state. It is not enough for developing
countries' governments to run from one capital to the other signing in
vestment agreements to attract foreign investments without a clear
understanding of their historical context, expectations, implications,
and the obligations they create for the host state. Even if the criticisms
of Judge Lauterpatcht's opinion are valid, this article contends that the
premise of the ruling in that case still resonate in most arbitral juris
prudence and scholarship.
To address the issues raised in this article, Part I examines the
history and evolution of the concept of international minimum stan
dard to lay the foundation for the main contention in this article
through the analysis of the significance of the Calvo doctrine and the
Hull formula. Part II analyzes the theory of internationalization of
state contracts and its nexus to the internationalization of investment
disputes. Setting out with the ruling of Judge Lauterpacht in the Nor
wegian Loans case, this part advances the argument that the
unsuccessful international minimum standard under customary inter
national law has been reincarnated in the form of standard clauses
such as the umbrella clause and the FET found in most international
investment agreements. Part III is the conclusion.
I.

INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

What became known as the main points of the Calvo doctrine,
represented Latin America's fundamental objections to the interna
tional minimum standard as recognized under customary
international law.21 In the context of investment disputes, interna
tional minimum standard under customary international law
stipulates that investment claims against the host state should not be
In£natonan™'£ M^"^
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subject to national jurisdiction or diplomatic intervention where the
foreign investor alleges a violation of international law.22 This princi
ple has been described as one that is designed for the protection of
investments in the host state.23
The origin of the international minimum standard as a princi
ple of customary international law could be traced to the investment
activities of foreign merchants in host states who experienced "denial
of justice" from a foreign state for the acts of states and its citizens
considered a violation of alien property rights. The experience of the
merchants in ancient times, developed a system whereby aggrieved
merchants doing business in foreign states appealed to their home
countries to intervene on their behalf with foreign states to assist in
the collection of debts from the citizens of the latter.24 Under this sys
tem, the merchants were authorized to take reprisals if there is no
response after the intervention of the merchant's home state.25 In sup
port of this mechanism, Root, the former United States Secretary of
State and a proponent of an international minimum standard in the
settlement of investment disputes, suggested direct military interven
tion to settle investment claims where the system in place in the host
state proves ineffective and discriminatory.26 On his part, Paparinskis
explained that the international minimum standard was elaborated
through the phenomenon of the "variety of legal techniques through
which [s]tates could protect the rights and interests of their nationals
abroad.'"27 Root probably wrote against the traditional belief of the
right to reprisals against the host state in the settlement of investment
disputes. This right of reprisals against the host state as a means of
settling disputes is linked to the concept of "denial of justice."
According to Paparinskis, the concept of denial of justice
against the alien trader in the host state may be traced to early times.
A commentator has noted that the practice was premised on the notion
that, "[elarly European institutional writings on the treatment of
22. See Berk Demirkol, Non-treaty Claims in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 31 LEIDEN
J. INT'l L. 59 (2018).
23. See RUDOLF DOLZF.R & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL IN
VESTMENT LAW 11 (2008).

24. See Don Wallace Jr., Fair and Equitable Treatment and Denial of Justice: Loewen v
US and Chattin v. Mexico, 2 TRANS. DISP. MGT. (2006), http://www.transnational-dis
pute-management.com (last visited June 4, 2015).
25. Id.
26. Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection of Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT'L L.
517, 521-22 (1910).
27. See MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND THE FAIR
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 20-21 (2013).

226

FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

Vol. 12:2:219

aliens by their host [s]tates set the stage for later controversies in the
area of foreign investment law."28 The effect of this concept was that
any breach of "the natural rights" of aliens in the host state without
justification amounted to a "denial of justice." In turn, one consequence
of the concept of the denial of justice is that it gave birth to two sister
theories on the treatment of alien investments in the host state: (1) the
theory of equality with the national of the host state; (2) the theory of
the treatment of alien property by some external standard over and
above the principle of equality. One commentator argued that the two
alternate theories created two similar views. Firstly, the theory of
equality "justified trade and investments as natural rights" in support
of the notion of the equal treatment of aliens with nationals of the host
state. Secondly, aliens should be "treated in accordance with some ex
ternal standard, which was higher than the national standard" in the
host state.29
This commentator concluded that the views associated with the
theories were calculated to facilitate trade and investment into the
global south by states with the capability to expand investments over
seas that in turn developed their home economies.30 Based on this
conclusion, it is fair to summarize that the concept of the "denial of
justice" and the right of reprisal against the host state is nothing but a
system designed for the protection of foreign investment in the global
south. Paulsson argued that "[sjtate responsibility for denial of justice
is justified, indeed required, in order to satisfy the international re
quirement that states provide for the effective protection of the rights
of foreigners
"31 It is this notion of international requirement for
the protection of alien property that transformed into the concept of
the international minimum standard on the protection and settlement
of investment disputes.
Furthermore, it seems that the underlying principle of the inswf''°n ™lmmT standard stipulates a two-way dispute resolution
system. On the one hand, it appears to give host states legal systems,
A
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matic intervention to settle investment disputes in so far as they can
allege a violation of international law. This article will now examine
how the Calvo doctrine responded to the two-way dispute resolution
system on the settlement of investment dispute in the host state.
A. The Principles of the Calvo Doctrine
Calvo's argument on the protection and settlement of invest
ment claims in the host state opposed the international minimum
standard under customary international law. Under the Calvo doc
trine, a state is entitled to freedom from external interference in the
exercise of its sovereignty.32 Calvo advanced the concept of "national
treatment. !,i He was opposed to the concept of the international mini
mum standard in the conduct of foreign investment and the protection
of alien property in the host state in the manner canvassed under cus
tomary international law. By national treatment, Calvo argued that
jurisdiction lies with the national courts of the host state over invest
ment disputes.34 Mourra explained that the substantive element of the
Calvo doctrine, "emphasizes that host states shall not grant any rights
or benefits to foreigners that exceed those accorded to their own na
tionals."35 The procedural elements of the Calvo doctrine argued
against any special remedies, privileges, or incentives for foreign inves
tors except the same as available to nationals of the host state.36
In Shan's opinion, the Calvo doctrine consists of three funda
mental elements: "anti-super-national-treatment . . . exclusive local
jurisdiction, and the exclusion of diplomatic protection" in the conduct
of foreign investment by the host state with foreign investors.37 The
Calvo doctrine was so widely received that a majority of Latin Ameri
can countries enshrined its principles in their national constitutions
and investment regimes.38 The doctrine also found its way into the
United Nation's new International Economic Order Charter at the
32. Garcia-Mora, supra note 21, at 206.
33. Wenshua Shan, From "North-South Divide" to "Private Public Debate": Revival of
the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 NW.
J. INT'L & BUS. 631, 632 (2006-2007).
34. Id.
35. Mary H. Mourra, The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-Based
Disputes, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 5, 8 (Mary H. Mourra &
Thomas E. Carbonneau, eds., 2008).
36. Id.
37. Shan, supra note 33, at 632.
38. DONALD SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNA
TIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 20-30 (1955).
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time, with one source stating that Latin America's contributions to the
emergence of the Charter were "no more than a thinly-disguised at
tempt to endow the Calvo doctrine."39
Opponents have criticized the principles of the Calvo doctrine
as being too extreme.40 Indeed, some critics of the Calvo doctrine have
argued that a strict adherence to the doctrine would make it difficult
for host states to be bound by the rules of international law on foreign
investments.41 Root rejected the underlying principles of the Calvo doc
trine.42 He argued that the international minimum standard, as
understood under customary international law should be accepted as a
fundamental standard of justice for the protection of foreign
investments.4,3
Root's criticism is indicative of the following propositions: (1) in
ternational law provides a simple standard of justice for the resolution
of foreign investment disputes; (2) domestic law of the host countries
must conform to international standard; and (3) foreign investment
disputes should not be subject to national treatment. There are legiti
mate questions that may be raised against the Calvo doctrine, but
Roots position is problematic because the international standard of
justice he relied on begs the question of how that same international
order or standard of justice should be defined or applied. This is a
weakness in Root s proposition. The inability of Root to address this
weakness makes his objections significant, but unsustainable.
If Root's major concern was the need for an effective mechanism
for the protection of foreign investment in the host state, the sugges
tion canvassed by Root is incomplete and not persuasive enough. The
premise of Root's arguments does not reflect a balanced approach to
the necessity for the protection of foreign investment in host states, at
least from the perspective of developing countries in the global south.
That necessity is consideration for the economic development of the
host state. It is contended that an international order articulated by
Root, can only be sustained through a framework and jurisprudence
that supports adequate and equal consideration of the legitimate ex
pectations of all the actors in the foreign direct investment ("FDI")
supra note 33^ at 632^33.
POUCYIZ IZCWLK
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paradigm. If the primary concern of host states in entering interna
tional investment agreements is to liberalize their investment climate
through the protection of investments, the nature of investment dis
putes should also reflect the purpose for that protection.44 That
purpose is considerations for contribution to economic development of
the host state. There is also an emerging school of thought that part of
that purpose should include scrutinizing the impact of investments on
human rights, public health, and the environment.45
Root made his arguments against the background of the need
for the protection of foreign investments in the host state, while Shan
made her observations based on the proliferation of international in
vestment agreements to promote investment liberalization. Shan made
a better argument. The inclination of most Latin American states to re
think foreign investment liberalization in their respective economies
and consent to investment treaty arbitration, particularly under the
ICSID Convention, supports Shan's thesis. One source observed that
there is a worldwide trend to reject what is considered as "neo-liberalist investment instruments" in favor of a more "balanced regime for
international investment."46 Still, the most direct challenge to the
Calvo doctrine came through what is referred to as the Hull formula
that emerged because of the expropriation of the investments of Ameri
can citizens in Mexico.47
B.

The Origin and Demise of the Hull Formula

The Hull formula was coined from the diplomatic exchanges be
tween the United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the
Mexican Ambassador to the United States over the Mexican govern
ment's alleged agrarian expropriation of properties of American
citizens in Mexico.48 The exchanges on the applicable law on the na
ture and resolution of the dispute reflect divergent views. The
diplomatic exchanges made the Hull formula to be, arguably, the most
44. Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Economic Development at the Core of the International
Investment Law Regime, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 587
• Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
45. See Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right
to Water and Beyond, 6 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 277, 277 (2015).
46. Wenhua Shan, Calvo Doctrine, State Sovereignty and the Changing Landscape of
International Investment Law, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 247, 298 (Wenhua Shan, et al. eds., 2008).
47. See discussion infra, § I.B.
48. Telegram from Cordell Hull, Sec'y of State, U.S., to Castillo Najera, Mex. Ambassa
dor to the U.S. (July 21, 1938), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl938v05/

230

FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

Vol. 12:2:219

notable approach to the unfair treatment of alien property in the terri
tory of the host state. According to Hull:
The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation.
It is confiscation. It is no less confiscation because there may be an
expressed intent to pay at some time in the future. If it were per
missible for a government to take the private property of the
citizens of other countries and to pay for it as when, in the judg
ment of that government, its economic circumstances and its local
legislation may perhaps permit, the safeguards which the constitu
tions of most countries and established international law have
sought to provide would be illusory .... We cannot question the
right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals in this fash
ion if it so desires .... But we cannot admit that a foreign
government may take the property of American nationals in disre
gard of the rule of compensation under international law. Nor can
we admit that any government unilaterally and through its munici
pal legislation can, as in this instant case, nullify this universally
accepted principle of international law, based on its reason, equitv
and justice.49

The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs embraced the Calvo doctrine
and responded this way:
My Government maintains . . . that there is in international law no
rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice,
which makes obligatory payment of neither immediate compensa
tion nor even deferred compensation, for expropriations of a general
and impersonal character like those which Mexico has carried out
for the purpose of redistribution of the land. The expropriation
made, in the course of our agrarian reform, do, in fact, have this
double character which ought to be taken very much into account in
order to understand the position of Mexico and rightly appraise her
apparent failure to meet her obligations. Without attempting to re
fute the point of view of the American Government, I wish to draw
your attention very specially to the fact that the agrarian reform is
not only one of the aspects of a program of social betterment... but
ah°KC0AT
fulfilling of the most important of the demands
1 f f1Can ptT ' ' ; • Nevertheless Mexico admits, in obedii§ indeed Undet" obligations to
h^Hprrvn'f
^ ^ ^
itSnlfr adequate manner; but the doctrine which she
onininrm of
t ° su J® ' w^!ch is based on the most authoritative
and mannor of61"8 °k** °U international law, is that the time
laws.™
Payments must be determined by her own

Leach, Sovereign
FORDHAM L. REV. 177. 182-90 (1959)
50.
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A synthesis of the Hull formula and the Calvo doctrine espouses
two opposite principles on the settlement of foreign investment dis
putes. The Hull formula proposes that the taking of alien property by
the host state is proper provided there is adequate and prompt com
pensation. In articulating the Hull formula, the proponent did not
define nor explained what constitutes an adequate, effective, or prompt
compensation as a remedy under customary international law. On the
other hand, the Calvo doctrine, as presented by the Foreign Affairs
Minister of Mexico, rejected the Hull formula on the treatment of alien
property by insisting on a consideration of the public interest as the
basis for the expropriation of alien property to mitigate the state's obli
gation through national treatment in accordance with national law.51
The Mexican government's position espoused the principle of national
treatment as opposed to the prompt, adequate, and effective compensa
tion proposed and argued by the Hull formula. The two divergent
positions reflected a conflict between an international minimum stan
dard and national treatment. National treatment is premised on the
national law of the host state.
The foundation of the Hull formula is rooted in the notion of an
international minimum standard, while the position advanced by Mex
ico is grounded in the principles of the Calvo doctrine. The opposing
views on the expropriation of foreign investment and the settlement of
the resulting dispute in the host state, defined the nature of foreign
investment with respect to the global south at the time.52 So much so,
that in 1962, the debate over the Calvo doctrine and Hull formula
found its way to the General Assembly of the United Nations ("the
UN").53 The UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 rejected both doc
trines by declaring in part that:
[Requisitioning [of alien property] shall be based on grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest . . . both
domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appro
priate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the
State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in
accordance with international law . . . where the question of com
pensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the
State taking such measures shall be exhausted.54
sador in Mex. (Aug. 3, 1938), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl938v05/
d663.
51.
52.
53.
•htm.
54.

Hay, supra note 50.
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 14.

G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), H 4 (Dec. 14, 1962), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/c2psnr
Id.
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Based on Resolution 1803,55 the opposition of developing coun
tries to the Hull formula was largely successful. Guzman noted that
the Hull formula "ceased to be a rule of customary international law"
because of the challenge mounted by countries in the global south.56
Guzman's observation was based on the premise that, "the majority of
the developing world supported a less stringent compensation require
ment for expropriations than the Hull Rule's 'prompt, adequate, and
effective' standard."57 The glee with which developing countries em
braced the UN Resolutions raised valid concerns about the protection
of foreign investments in the host state. It was after the unfortunate
fate of the concept of the international minimum standard that the ICSID Convention was discussed, negotiated, and ratified.
Under the ICSID Convention, the theory of internationalization
of state contracts has been consistently upheld through the interpreta
tion of applicable investment agreements and treaties.58 This theory
elevates investments disputes from national jurisdiction in support of
the application of an evolving international investment law.59 The util
ity of this theory in investment arbitration after the failure of the Hull
formula and the Calvo doctrine is a way to restore investors' confidence
on the protection of foreign investments in the hope that the promotion
of foreign investment for economic development may not be hampered.
The remaining part of this article examines the significance of the the
ory of internationalization of state contracts in the context of the
preceding analysis.
II.

THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE CONTRACTS

The legal relationship between the host state and foreign inves
tors in international investment law and arbitration may be created by
state contracts. A state contract is "a contract made between the state,
or an entity of the state . . . created by statute within a State that is
55.

G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), H 4.

uh r,7 ^7r7 T; 7Zman' Wky LCDS Stg" Treaties that Hwt Them: Explaining the Pop
ularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VIRG. J. INT'I,. L 639 641 (1998)
57. Id., at 647.
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given control over an economic activity, and a foreign national or a le
gal person of foreign nationality."60 State contracts create
international obligations for the host state and the foreign investor in
the conduct of foreign investment.61 The theory of internationalization
of state contracts posits that, regardless of any clear choice of law be
tween the host state and the foreign investor on the law applicable to
an investment claim, the principles of international law supersede na
tional laws in the interpretation of the obligations and liabilities of the
host state in the event of an investment dispute.62 Maniruzzaman ex
plained the theory this way:
The theory of internationalization of state contracts poses some of
the hardest questions that relate to both public and private interna
tional law. The theory suggests that, no matter what law the
parties to such a contract choose as the proper law of the contract,
international law superimposes their choice and applies automati
cally as the overriding governing law. Thus where the law of the
host state applies as the sole applicable law either by virtue of the
parties' express choice or by the conflict of laws rule closest connec
tion in the absence of such choice, the theory of internationalization
triggers off not only the theoretical controversies of monism versus
dualism of public international law but also the issues of party au
tonomy and the doctrine of the proper law of the contract in private
international law. Besides theoretical interest, the matter has great
practical importance in the real world of foreign investment dispute
settlement.63
Prior to Maniruzzaman's thesis, there was a strong argument
for the theory in the dissenting opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the
landmark decision in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans.64
In this case, while conceding to the view of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) that an international contract
may be subject to national law, Judge Lauterpacht held that where
national legislation is contrary to the international obligations of the
host state, the notion that national legislation is exclusive and applica
ble in the settlement of an investment dispute is "subversive of
international law."65 He stated that, "it is not enough for a state to
60. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., State Contracts, 3, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11,
U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.5 (2004).
61. See generally Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host
-State "Commitment" and the Myth of Stability, 14 AM. REV. INT'I. ARB. 362-414 (2013).
62. A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (2001).
63. Id.
64. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 119571 (July 6).
65. Id. at 37 (Lauterpacht J., dissenting).
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bring a matter under the protective umbrella of its legislation, possibly
of a predatory character, in order to shelter it effectively from any con
trol by international law."66 According to Judge Lauterpacht, because
an "international contract" may be subject to some national law, "does
not mean that that fsicj national law is a matter which is wholly
outside the orbit of international law."67The reasoning of Judge Lauterpacht's opinion was based on the notion that national law may not
be applied to the interpretation of state contracts [investment agree
ments] where such application is a violation or conflicts with
international law. Judge Lauterpacht explained that, "the question of
conformity of national legislation with international law is a matter of
international law."68
In the Norwegian Loans case, the French government instituted
proceedings on behalf of French investors who held bond certificates
issued by Norwegian financial institutions.69 The dispute specifically
pertains to certain loans floated through the Mortgage Bank of the
Kingdom of Norway and by the Small Holding and Workers Housing
Bank. 0 At the proceedings, the Norwegian government premised its
preliminary objection to the admissibility of the French government's
claim on the grounds that the subject matter of the dispute is within
the domain of national law and not international law.71 In other words,
orway claimed that the PCIJ lacks jurisdiction because the compul
sory jurisdiction of the court in relation to the parties involved is
restricted to disputes concerning international law, and therefore the
aim put forward by France is not admissible by the Court. The founinflnl 0.f,Jufdge LauterPacht's dissenting opinion is probably
fluenced by two instructive arguments by France in reply to the NorS preliminary objections on the admissibility of' the claims.
cernin^h6 C°™pete?Cf.and Jurisdiction of the PCIJ in all disputes conand hfpv lnterPretation of a treaty, any question of international law
tTonaoZ r'u 7 ^ ^ constitute* a violation of an internaaccentanrp nf
f* aCCepted by Norw^ and Fruiice through
the recover^ f™ TufHlsory Junsdiction of the PCIJ.7* Secondly, that
^ernmenT
^ ™ inte™tional loan claim from the
government of the debtor state by the government which has adopted
66.

Certain Norwegian

68.

Id.

69.

Certain Norwegian Uans (Fr. v. Nor.,, Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6,, at 39.

71.
72.

Id. at 40.
Id.
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the cause of its nationals who are holders of bond certificates, raises an
issue that falls withm the competence of the PCIJ by virtue of the acceptance by both parties.73
There is no question that the transactions in issue are invest
ments in the context of trans-border or foreign investment by French
citizens in the territory of Norway. Judge Lauterpacht's opinion on the
primacy of international law in the interpretation of state contracts
involved in foreign investment dispute, underscores the theory of the
internationalization of state contracts. This is also evident in Maniruzzaman's explanation above. Maniruzzaman's depiction of the theory
sheds light on the trend by host states, mostly from the global south,
to provide expressly the law of the host state as the proper law or
applicable law' in what he calls "economic development agreements."74
In this context, economic development agreements mean international
or foreign investment agreements between the host state and the for
eign investor. Maniruzzaman's submission addressed the question of
internationalization of state contracts through the prism of the Monist
and Dualist schools of thought in international law.75
Monism and Dualism represent two opposing theories on the
relationship between international law and national law.76 Proponents
of the Monist school of thought maintain that the application of na
tional law to foreign investment disputes should be subject to the rules
of international law.77 The adherents of the dualism school of thought
insist that, international law "is inherently distinct and requires states
to undertake certain actions before international principles may be re
lied upon in national courts.'"78 Except for the relevance of the Monist
and Dualist school of thoughts to the theory of the internationalization
of state contracts, the merits and demerits of the contentions of the two
schools of thoughts are outside the scope of this article. However, anal
ogously, Judge Lauterpacht's opinion makes the proposition that
national law is inferior to international law in the adjudication of for
eign investment disputes.79 Judge Lauterpacht's views on the
supremacy of international law have been criticized by many a scholar
73.
74.
75.

Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6), at 40.
Maniruzzaman, supra note 62, at 309.
Id.

76. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Monist Supremacy Clause and a Dualistic Supreme
Court: The Status of Treaty Law as U.S. Law in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
AW: MONISM AND DUALISM (Marko Novakovic ed. 2013.)
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 37 (19571 (July 6)
auterpacht J., dissenting).
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of international law. For example, Brownlie opined that Judge Lauter
pacht's doctrine of Monism is "antipathetic to the legal corollaries of
the existence of sovereign states, and reduces municipal law to the sta
tus of pensioner of international law."80
In criticizing Judge Lauterpacht, Brownlie observed that thp
formers view on the theory of Monism "takes the form of an assertion
of the supremacy of international law even within the municinal
sphere, coupled with well-developed views on the individual as a sub
ject of international law."8' On his part, instead of offering a criticism
udge Fitzmaunce advocated a cautious approach when relying on the

^assaasaxt
wolwiftoTaveWoT °f Whet,her the alleSed breach of contract
fore it l n H K
involved a violation of international law. There
in f' f k
if tWr°ng 0 attribute to him the view that if there is
n fact a breach by a [sjtate of a contract between itself and a for

not afforded to the foreigner'in'the local'co'urts "g »°^

WaS

thepri2cv 0OntirnS't°f J nge LauterPacht'a "P^on in articulatNon***» Loans Case was
hilhlighted mlinlv fhr™
dSmS ^ by Br°Wnhe and by
FiCauritreavea Mn
th3t Judge LaUter
Pacht's o^ion rthecase uXTof:
the theory of international- +•
^erence cannot be an authority for
ing

h»s«, z zzzzzzzzz rn,1m"—

does not create an interneti
••
state contract "on its own
law is designated by the conTracting'nart;011 TT ' u°Ugh international
partles to be tbe governing law of
the contract."85 Maniruzzaman'*
1S credible and persuasive
in the context of international cn°nC
Maniruzzaman, international r mmercial arbitration. According to
Of private international characteXXweXX11
"particularly
'
However, Maniruzzaman's consi.
^Wht-The Scholar as a Judge: Part 1, 64-5,

37 BMR. YR.
83. Id.
84.

Maniruzzaman,

86.

Id.

supra

note

62, at 313.

WY!INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 237
elusion, after his analysis of Judge Lauterpachfs dissenting opinion in
the Norwegian Loans Case, is not consistent with the nature of foreign
investment disputes with respect to investment treaty arbitration On
the one hand with reference to investment treaty arbitration, state
contracts with foreign investors are by their nature internationalized
Once concluded, state contracts create international obligations on
host states under applicable international investment agreements to
guarantee the full faith and purpose of the clauses contained in appli
cable investment agreements or investment dispute resolution
mechanisms such as under the ICSID Convention. The reality of the
international investment law regime makes the operation of state con
tracts subject to considerations of the obligations of the host state on
the protection of foreign investment. These considerations are now
grounded in arbitral practice and international investment law.87 On
the other hand, the advent of investment treaty arbitration is the evi
dence that foreign investors may now commence arbitration directly
for claims arising from state contracts in the host state.
Brownlie s criticisms and Judge Fitzmaurice's caveat against
the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans Case has
been diminished by the progressive development of international in
vestment law and arbitration. Brownlie wrote at a time when only
sovereign states were subjects of international law. The ICSID Con
vention and other international investment agreements that provide
mechanisms for the resolution of foreign investment disputes, have
trashed the premise of Brownlie's criticisms. Foreign investors are now
subjects of international law in the context of investment treaty arbi
tration for the settlement of foreign investment disputes.88 Judge
Fitzmaurice's caveat was an attempt to limit Judge Lauterpacht's
opinion to the jurisdictional aspect of the Norwegian Loans Case.
...8v7mSee e'g-> Francisco O. Vicuna, Of Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market, 8
MAX PLANCK Y.B. United NATIONS L. 341, 346 (2004).
88. See Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International of International
W> 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (2011) (stating that, "|i]f foreign businesses are, within
e context of BITs and FTAs, really subjects of international law because they are given
e ability to make claims directly against host states, arguably the investment regime is
not just a particularized application of traditional espousal practice. If, as some scholars
an arbitral decisions are beginning to suggest, investor-state arbitration is wholly new
mechanism designed to permit a new subject of international law to have equal standing
a ongside and old (state) subject of international law, a number of legal consequences could
emerge. If the right of this new subject of international law is in no sense derivative of the
ig t of its home state ... it could follow that home states no longer retain the right to waive
e right of their investors to file a claim."); see also Tillman R. Braun, Globalization: The
riving Force in International Investment Law, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT AR
BITRATION 491-506 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
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Judge Fitzmaurice attempted to make this distinction by creating the
impression that Judge Lauterpacht's opinion might have been differ
ent if the latter was called upon to consider the substantive question of
whether a breach of state contract in that case involved a violation of
international law.89 With due respect, Judge Fitzmaurice's caveat is
speculative. There appears to be no indication that Judge Lauterpacht
might have viewed the issues raised in the preliminary objections to
the jurisdiction of the PCIJ differently in a substantive hearing. Judge
Lauterpacht himself noted in the same opinion that:
It seems a sound principle of judicial procedure that, unless the pro
visions of its statute or other cogent legal considerations make that
impossible, the Judgment of the Court should attach to the submis
sions of the Parties a purpose, though not necessarily an effect
which the Parties attach to them. Applied to objections to the juris
diction of the Court, that principle means that, when a party has
advanced objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, the decision on
the question of jurisdiction must be reached by reference to ejec
tions which in the intention of the Party advancing them, are
principal rather than subsidiary and which are substantial rather
than formal.90
• t t The cr®dlblllty of Judge Fitzmaurice's caveat, if at all, is incon
sistent with the reality of international investment law and arbitration
regime, particular y under the ICSID Convention. This is so, because,
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This recognition and practice in most investment arbitration case law
resonates more with the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwe
gian Loans Case. Foreign investors have often alleged a violation of
international law or obligation against the host state resulting from
the act or omission to guarantee non-interference with the contractual
rights of the foreign investors in state contracts or any other invest
ment agreement regulating the transaction.95 Judge Lauterpacht's
dissenting opinion is predicated on his acceptance of the complaint of
the French government; that the subsequent currency legislation en
acted by Norway suspending the operation of the gold clause attached
to the loans bonds, was an act that interfered with the state contract
with the French bond holders.®- The act by the Norwegian government
was contrary and in conflict with its obligations under international
law and thereby made Norwegian law inapplicable.95 According to
Judge Lauterpacht, "it is that very legislation, in so far as it affects
French bondholders, which may be the cause of violation of international law of which France complains."96
It is important for the global south to understand that, since the
ruling of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans Case, there have
been deliberate attempts by investors from the global north countries
to facilitate the process of internationalization of investment disputes
or the protection of investments.97 Notable examples of the process of
internationalization include the birth of the ICSID Convention and the
1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investment Abroad.98 The
brella clause in a BIT or international investment agreement is that the host state
undertakes to abide by its contractual agreement with the foreign investor. See Kenneth J.
B."'ATRRAL INVESTMKNT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 256fin'fomn
4U10) (noting that the observance of obligations clause is referred to as an umbrella
"because ifc brings contractual commitments within the coverage, or umbrella, of the
93. See Johnson & Volkov, supra note 4.
94. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6), at 34-66
Lauterpacht J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id. at 37.
97. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties
on Customary International, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 27 (2004).
98. The history of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investments Abroad Ihereina er the Abs-Shawcross Draft) may be credited with the origin of umbrella clauses as the
rm ls understood under international investment law and arbitration today. See Wong,
supra note 9, at 146 (citing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
^ereinafter the OECD Draft) Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.
OFf'n State^
Abs-Shawcross Draft influenced certain draft conventions of the
Bra1> particularly Art. 2 of the OECD Draft which provides that, "|e]ach party shall
at
a
times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in relation to property of
na lona's °f any other party."); see also, Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of Umbrella
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Abs-Shawcross Draft was a private effort that was aggressively pushed
by "European lawyers" for the protection of foreign investments in the
global south." The intention of the Abs-Shawcross Draft was to secure
the protection of foreign investments under international law 100 This
effort was successful to the extent that its semblance found its wav to
the OECD Draft. The OECD Draft, which embodied the core recom
mendation of the Abs-Shawcross Draft on the protection of foreign
investments in the host state, failed to pass the OECD Council that
considered its propriety at the time."" However, the OECD was able to
recommend Article 2 of the draft convention to member states to utilize
m their BITs. 1 This would allow member states to affirm the applica
tion of international rules as the international minimum standard for
the regulation and protection of foreign investments in the host state
The recommendation has been widely accepted.1" It is now referred to
as umbrella clauses found in the model investment agreements or treaUe.of member states of the OECD used as templates to negotiate BITs
with countries mostly from the global south.1" To understand the un
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hands of the Iranian government.™ The AIOC unsuccessfully pursued
fgtePSr^Ue 7,
r3!10?' b6f°re the ^ternationaf Court 0f
Justice ( ICJ ). The failure of its legal attempts at resolving the dis
pute under international law was linked to a defective provision in the
e
concessionary agreement.108
The dispute was later settled under a subsequent government
regime that was more open to foreign investments in Iran and on terms
that deviated from the original advice of counsel.™ It is notewnrthv
that the AIOC originally intended to resolve the dispute based on the
legal advice provided by counsel for the AIOC.no The said legal
recommended a consortium agreement and an "umbrella treaty" be
tween ^an and the United Kingdom that incorporates the consortium
agreement, ni The combined effect of the agreements, as recom
mended, would have been to make a breach of the consortium
agreement ipso facto amount to a breach of the umbrella treaty. The
umbrella treaty was not part of the terms with which the dispute was
eventually resolved
Still, the umbrella treaty clause that was for
mulated by the counsel to the AIOC was the basis of the umbrella
clause found m the Abs-Shawcross Draft that developed into the clause
north*J*1

m the m°del BITS
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The arbitral tribunals conflicting decisions in SGS v. Paki
and\ SGS v. Philippines115 will go down in the history of the
evolution of international investment law and investment arbitration
as one of the most controversial interpretation of the umbrella clause,
including their roles in the internationalization of investment disputes,
ne decisions are by far the most dominant example of the entrenchstan1"
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ment of the Abs-Shawcross Draft. The intention of the Draft was to
elevate contractual investment claims to treaty claims.1,(5 An elevation
in this respect internationalizes investment disputes. The SGS deci
sions have been widely criticized mainly because the rulings confused
the issue of jurisdiction over contractual and treaty claims in the arbi
tration of investment claims.117 The underlying investment contracts
in issue in those cases contained an exclusive forum selection clause
that designated a different forum for the settlement of investment dis
putes contrary to international arbitration under the applicable
BITs.118 The two main issues in the SGS cases was whether an arbitral
tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over breach of contract claims based
on the application of an umbrella clause, and if so, whether the same
arbitral tribunal may not be restricted where the underlying contract
contains an exclusive forum selection clause contrary to the BIT under
review.The SGS v. Pakistan arbitral tribunal held that an arbitral
tribunal lacks jurisdiction on the ground that an umbrella clause do
not extend to contractual claims.1*" In the SGS v. Philippines case
which was on all fours with SGS v. Pakistan, the former held that it
has jurisdiction over contractual claims, but went further to state that
an arbitral tribunal should not exercise jurisdiction where the invest
ment contract contains an exclusive forum selection clause for the
VeStTnt d isPute121 In hi* analysis, Wong answered
Toth nT, •
u
both questions raised in the SGS cases in the affirmative.- On his
part, Crawford was reluctant to take a definite stand, noting:
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Except that the SGS e. Pakistan tribunal resisted the attempt
to elevate contractual breaches to BIT violations- there has been I
consistent pattern by arbitral tribunals to internationalize investment
disputes through the broad application of umbrella clauses since the
decisions in the SGS cases.- For example, in the annulment proceedmgs of Campania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal
LK
r£entine Republic, the claim was a review of the $300 million
damages investment arbitration commenced by the claimants a
French company organized under the laws of the Respondent through
their Argentine affiliate - In this case, the Respondent did not di
rectly or affirmatively interfere in the investment by Tucuman but
claimants alleged that the failure of the Respondent to prevent the
Province of Tucuman from refraining to take certain actions against
the concession contract infringed their rights under the France-Argen
tina BIT.127 The contentious concession contract did not make any
reference to the France-Argentina BIT or the ICSID Convention, except that the BIT contained some remedial provisions.128 The ad hoc
Committee characterized the remedial measures in the BIT as "an in
ternational law standard, expressly or by clear implication," applying
to 'investments made by investors."1211 However, the concession con
tract which is one of the most common forms of state contracts
provided for a forum selection clause.^ This was to the effect that the
resolution of any dispute arising from the concession contract, concern
ing its interpretation and application, was to be submitted to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of
124.
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Tucuman.131 On the core issue of whether the forum selection clause in
the concession contract should be accepted and applied by the tribunal
to set aside the remedial provisions in the France-Argentine BIT, the
ad hoc Committee upheld the submissions of the Claimants finding
"that the fact that the investments concerns a Concession Contract
made with Tucuman . . . does not mean that the dispute falls outside
the scope of the BIT."132 This ad hoc Committee advertently or perhaps
inadvertently, embraced the theory of the internationalization of state
contracts as applicable under international investment law and arbi
tration.133 The ad hoc Committee was unequivocal when it found:
[W]here the "fundamental basis of the claim" is a treaty [an invest
ment treaty] laying down an independent standard by which the
conduct of the parties is to be judged, the existence of an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the re
spondent state or one of its subdivisions cannot operate as a bar to
the application of the treaty standard.134
In reaching its conclusion on this issue, the ad hoc Committee reasoned
that the determination whether the act of a state is internationally
wrongful is a question of international law that is not impacted by a
consideration of whether or not the same act could be lawful under na
tional law.135
Similarly, the ad hoc arbitration case Eureko B. V. u. Republic of
Roland,1™ also involved a concession contract between the parties.
1 he facts and issues raised in this investment treaty arbitration were
similar to those of Vivendi. One of the main issues for determination in
this investment treaty arbitration was whether alleged breaches of
contract-based claims governed by national law could be separated
from alleged BIT violation without recourse to the interpretation and
application of the contract under review in the investment dispute.137
ollowing Vivendi as a persuasive authority, the ad hoc Committee
held as follows:
^eH1pnri1v»fPlit"de auti1°rity for the proposition that when a
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The scholarship and jurisprudence on the extensive, and some
times extreme, analysis of the effect of umbrella clauses and FET and
their contributions to the internationalization of investment disputes
misses a vital consideration. Granted that the overwhelming support
for the protection of foreign investments in the host state is valid for
obvious reasons. Often when investment disputes arising from under
lying investments are elevated to treaty claims under applicable BITs,
the economic and sovereign regulatory power of the host state is re
strained. When this occurs, host states are left with no plank to stand
on to articulate and assert their expectations in the context of interna
tional investment law and arbitration. There is little or no analysis of
the effect of this on the economy and international investment regimes
of host states, particularly from the global south. The international in
vestment law regime and arbitration should not simply be a
mechanism for the protection of investments. There is a need to recog
nize and analyze the component of the promotion of investment for
contribution to the economic development inherent in the host state's
regulatory authority for economic development considerations. Some
host states in the global south are agitated.139 Some have responded to
what might be considered as a one-sided approach to international in
vestment law and arbitration in ways that can undermine its
progress.110 Admittedly, the lacuna created as a result of the insuffi
cient consideration of the full implications of the internationalization
138.
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of investment disputes on the host state cannot be placed on the door
steps of arbitral tribunals or foreign investors alone. Host states have a
responsibility to properly define and clarify their legal and regulatory
regime on foreign investments.
CONCLUSION

The opposing views of Calvo and Hull, mostly addressed the is
sue of expropriation under international law at the time. It is fair to
state, with some plausibility, that the act of expropriation is at the root
of most international investment disputes. At the height of the conflict
between the Calvo doctrine and the Hull formula, expropriation meant
the actual taking of the alien property by the host state. The notion of
expropriation has broadened over time. Under international invest
ment law and arbitration, the act or omission of the host state that
directly or indirectly infringes on the proprietary rights of the foreign
investor is expropriation. This expanded notion is hinged on the obliga
tion on the host state to guarantee the observance of contractual
obligations entered with foreign investors under BITs and independent
foreign investment related contracts. Despite the failure of the interna
tional minimum standard to satisfy the test of customary international
law, the concept has been reincarnated through standard provisions in
BITs such as umbrella clauses and the FET standard.
Considering the evolution of investment law and arbitration, it
is not a good approach by the global south to rely on national laws, or
contracts founded on same, to regulate and interpret international in
vestment law obligations and dispute resolution mechanisms. In cases
where national laws have been clearly applied to settlements of invest
ment isputes, umbrella clauses have been upheld and applied broadly
RTTnt^ru ati°naliZe the disputes by subjecting it to the provisions of the
Bit This is a lesson the global south should draw from the historical
development and evolution of international investment law and arbira ion.
ese countries should take steps to re-negotiate and insert
clauses in their BITs that reflect their expectations, particularly as it
pertains to covered investments, investment dispute resolution mecha
nisms, and considerations of contribution to economic development by
the covered investments. Doing nothing will create more confusion and
frustration with the investment treaty arbitration regime. The situaoZTn TTw3 maS?iYe withdrawal from the ICSID Convention
addressed with a smarter and a more balanrpd an
11 Tld
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bal south to international investment law

